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I.

INlRODUCTION

In light of Ille highly publicized energy shortages in California and
the high fuel prices nation\vide, the Bush Administration wants Congress

to pass legislation that \vould permit oil exploration in the Alaskan Arctic
Instructor, Hamline University School of La\v; B.A. 1983, Grambling State
University; J.D. 1988, University of tl-1innesota; M.P.A. 1989, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of
Public Affairs, University of Minnesota; LL.M. 1997, University of Houston.
-c
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National Wildlife Refuge. 1 President Bush has been able to make a
strong case for his position because oil is an important part of our daily
lives. We use it to run our cars, to heat our homes, and to cook our food.
Thus, any action that would make the price of oil cheaper appears to be a
good idea. The Bush Administration's proposal has also received support
from natives ofAlaska because of the promise of economic prosperity in
the region. 2
Ho\vever, the Bush Administration's desire to allow drilling in
Alaska has not gone unchallenged. :i Environmentalists \Vho oppose

drilling in Alaska have been quick to point out that pollution from
petroleum products is one of the most widespread problems in pollution
of the ocean.4 They also emphasize that oil pollution can have
devastating effects on the marine environment.5 For example, the
discharge of oil into the ocean may disrupt the food chain by poisoning
algae, kelp, phytoplankton, benthic organisms, clams, crabs, lobsters, and
sea birds.6 In addition, the destruction ofmarine habitats and the poisoning
of many millions of invertebrates can ruin the breeding grounds of many
1
birds and fish. Physical damage to the marine environment from oil
spills can also cripple the local fishing industry. s Aside from causing
physical damage toA:he environment, an oil spill can destroy the aesthetic
beauty of the coastal area. 9 As a result, tourism in the coastal areas near
an oil spill is often adversely affected.
Every year thousands of oil spills are reported that either pollute, or
threaten to pollute, the waters of the United States. 1° From 1973 through
1984, the United States experienced between 9000 and 12,000 oil spills
in its \Vaters each year. 11 Most of those spills were small enough that no
I.
See Robert Schlesinger, Citing Oil Need, Bush Pushes Energy Bill; Senate Seeks
Block on Arctic Drilling, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct 12, 2001, atA6.
2.
See id.
3.
See id.
4.
See David P. Berschauer, Oil and llilter Don't ,\1ix; Federal Private causes ofAction
for Oil Spill Damages, 20 S\V. U. L. REv. 395, 397 (1991) (discussing the hazards of oil
pollution).
5.
See id.
6.
Id. at 397-95.
7.
B. McCOl\'NAUGHEY & R. ZOTIOLI, INTRooucnONTO MARINE BIOLOGY 478-SO (4th
ed. 1983).
8.
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501E2d558, 560 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing damage to
fishing grounds as a result ofa Santa Barbara oil spill).
9.
Dan McFadden, Paradise Lost: EX)(ON VALDEZ 10 Years Later, tli1SNBC, at
http://\VW\V.msnbc.com/ne\vs/252314.asp (Mar. 24, 2001).
10. For example, in 1989, the Coast Guard investigated 7859 marine pollution incidents.
R. Michael·Underhill, The Sovereign As Plaintiff Clean Seas and Other Coin of the Realm, 3
U.S.F.1'AAR. L.J. 37, 37 (1991).
11. H.R REP. No. 101-1026, at26 (1990),reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 727, 750.
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cleanup effort \Vas deemed necessary. Nevertheless, during that time
period, the total amount of oil released into the United States marine
environment from oil spills ranged from a lo\V of 8.2 million gallons in
13
1977 to a high of21.5 million gallons in 1975. According to the United
States Coast Guard (U.S.C.G.), from 1980 to 1986, 91 million gallons of
14
oil spilled into U.S. \vaters.
According to statistics maintained by the U.S.C.G., there have been
no spills of O\'er one million gallons since 1990. 15 The volume of oil
spilled into United States \vaters has continued to decline. 1" Ho,vever, the
largest oil spill into United States \Vaters, since 1996, occurred on
17
November 28, 2000.
That spill happened when a tank ship,
WESTCHESTER, grounded in the rvlississippi River. is As a result of the
accident, approximately 538,000 gallons of crude oil \Vere spilled into the
river from the number one cargo tank. 19
In order to further bolster their position that oil spills pose a
significant threat, environmentalists have raised the specter of the
On March 24, 1989, the tanker EXXON
EXXON VALDEZ."
VALDEZn ran aground on Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound, Alaska.ii
The result \Vas the \Vorst oil spill disaster in the nation's histOl)'. 23 Almost
eleven million gallons of crude oil poured into one of the most sensitive
24
ecosystems in the country in less than five hours. The damage to the
environment \Vas immediate and severe. An estimated 250,000 seabirds,
2800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, and 22 killer \Vhales
\Vere killed as a result oft.he spill.25 The oil \vashed up on approximatel:i,r
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Underhill,supranote10,at37.
15.
Id.
16.
See United States Coast Guard, Oil Spill Report: Annual Data and Graphics (1969
2000), at http://\\'\V\V,u.scg.millhq!gm/n\VClresponsc/stats/ac.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19. Id.
20. See Eyak Native Vil!. v. Exxon Corp., 25 E3d 773 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1102 (1994).
21. · The ship has been renamed SEA RIVER tvIEDITERRAi'JEAN and carries crude
beti.\·cen the lviiddle East and Europe. Sec Seariver l\1ar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 E Supp.
9, 10 (D.D.C. 1997).
22. !dcFadden, supra note 9, at http://\V\V\v.msnbc.com/ne\vs/252314.asp.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. The state of Alaska and the United States sued E:....'"Xon for the injury to the
environment. In order to resolve those cases, Ex.\:on signed a consent decree on October 8, 1991,
agreeing to pay at least $900 million to restore the damaged natural resources. Sec Eyak Nati~'e
Vil!., 25 F.3d at 775.
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1300 miles of shoreline and drifted as far \vest as the Aleutian
Peninsula.20 According to a reporter on the scene, the oil \Vas
everyvvhere, even tracked into the hotels. 21 In addition to the EXXON
VALDEZ incident, persons against drilling in Alasl<a have pointed to a
recent oil spill into Prince William Sound, Alaska to demonstrate that the
area is still vulnerable to oil spills.28
Industry leaders and others \Vho support oil exploration in Alaska

have countered the environmentalists by noting that the likelihood of
another EXXON VALDEZ is remote. Moreover, persons in favor of
drilling in Alaska contend that Congress has taken the necessary steps to
deal \Vith oil spills.29 They claim that one of those steps taken \Vas \vhen
Congress unanimously passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). 30 In
signing the OPA into la\V, President George Bush declared it to be a
means ofpro\riding ''the prevention, response, liability, and compensation
components [\vhich] fit together into a compatible and \Vorkable system
that strengthens the protection of our cnvironment."31
The enactment of the OPA was a step in the right direction, but the
OPA is not a cure-all. One of the key purposes of the OPA \Vas to
respond to the problems created by the EXXON VALDEZ spilL'2 The
preventative measures \Vere designed to avoid another oil spill of that
magnitude.' 3 Unfortunately, as long as oil products are transported O\'er
the Vl'ater, there is the potential for a major oil spill. Consequently, before
relying upon the safeguards of the OPA, the supporters of oil drilling in
Alaska need to take a hard look at the liability scheme established by the

OPA.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the liability scheme
established by the OPA to determine if it is adequate to deal with another
26.
Mc'Faddcn, supra note 9, at http:!/V>'\V\v.msnbe.eom!news/252314.asp.
27.
Bruce Gray reported, "The oil \Vas evel")'\vhere.... I had not imagined that ten ye;m;
later there still could be oil on the beach. Thc oil looks exactly like it did, only in smaller
amounts. It \\'as just as disgusting looking and it still has that toxic smell," McFadden, supra note
9, at http:l/\V\\'\V.msnbc.com!nc\vs/252314.asp.
28. On August 4, 2001, a sunken fishing vessel spilled about 35,000 gallons of dieselthe entire contents of the boat's fuel tank-into Prince \Villiam Sound. See Associated Press,
\Vorkem i\1opping Up Die.>el Spilled in Pn'nee Vlilliam Sound, Cm. T1ua.,Aug. 8, 2001, atA12.
29.
See 147 CONG. REc. 58,373 (daily ed. July 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. :tvfurko\vski).
30.
Id.
31.
Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 1465, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N
861-I; sec also Daniel Kopec & Philip Peterson, Crude Legislation: Liability and Compensation
Uvdcr t11e Oil Pollution Act of1990, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 598 (1992).
32.
Sec Steven R. S\vanson, OPA +10: The Oil Pollutiov Control Act of 1990 After 10
Years, 32 J. MAR. L. & CO:.f. 135, 142 (2001).
33. PaulA.C. Jaffe &Antonio J. Rodriguez, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR.
L.J. I, 23 (1990).
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major oil spill. To that end, this Article is divided into three Parts. The
first Part examines the liability scheme that existed prior to the EXXON
VALDEZ oil spill. In the second Part, the Article anal)'Zes the liability
scheme that \Vas created by the OPA. The final Part of the Article

evaluates \Vhether the OPA's liability scheme \Vould be able to effectively
deal with an oil spill of the magnitude of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill.
II.

HISTORY OF OJL SPILLS AND lBE PRE-OPA LIABILITY REGIME

The public became more a\vare of the environmental dangers of oil
transportation after the TORREY CANYON disaster off the southwest
coast of England on March 18, 1967.34 The grounded oil supertanker
TORREY CANYON poured 120,000 tons of heavy crude oil onto a
hundred miles of British and French coasts." The clean-up problems and
costs became a public concern.36 The TORREY CANYON incident \Vas
follo\ved b)' an oil spill that occurred off the coast of Santa Barbara,
31
California, in 1969. Because the Santa Barbara spill occurred in the
United States, the American public opinion focused upon the additional
hazards associated \vith exploration facilities. 33 Therefore, the public
looked to the United States Congress to enact legislation to address the
problem.
Congressional response to the American people's desire for
legislation that addressed oil spill liability proceeded at an .irregular
pace_i9 Hence, the end result \Vas a group of statutes that established a
patch\vork scheme of liability limits, legal defenses, and compensation
programs. ~ The requirements of those statutes \Vere amended, expanded,
and strengthened by the OPA.~ Although the major parts of those
statutes still have application in admiralty la\v, their liability provisions
4

1

34.

l\.IICH.i\EL

lNTERi'<ATIO:-J..\L LA\V 5

l\1'GONIGLE
(1979).

&

11ARK \V.

ZACHER,

POLLUTION,

POLITICS AND

35. Id.
36. Ai'!:er the supertanker TORREY CANYON spilled crude oil off the coast of England
in 1967, Congress enacted the Port and \Vatenvay5 Safety Act of 1972 to require more stringent
regulations for tankers and to providi.; for more eompreh~nsive remedies in the event of an oil
spill. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994).
37. Thomas J. \Vagner, The Oil Pol11.1tion Act of 1990: An Analysis, 21 J. MAR. L. &
Co:..t 569, 570-71 (1990).
38. Id.
39. Note, St.atutory Liability for Oil Pollution from Vessels in Aiarine Enviromnents, 3
U.S.F. !l,:L\R. LJ. 267, 269 (1991).
40. Id.
41. United States v. !viurphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 939 F. Supp. 489, 49 i (E.D. La.
1996).
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have been affected by the OPA.42 Thus, any article analyzing the impact
of the OPA must include some discussion of the relevant parts of those
statutes.

A.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Congress's passing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) of 1970 began the modern era of domestic oil legislation.4;
The law, as expanded by the FWPCA Amendments of 1972, declared a
national policy that prohibited discharges of oil and imposed civil
penalties and strict liability for federal cleanup costs.4-l Section 311 of
the FWPCA addressed oil and hazardous substance spill liability.45
Under the Act, the responsible parties included ovmers, operators, or any
onshore or offshore facility from which oil \vas discharged into or upon
the navigable waters of the United States, the adjoining shorelines, or the

waters of the contiguous zone. 46
The FWPCA authorized, but did not mandate, federal removal ofoil
spills and approval of response plans.47 The Act gave the federal
government the authority to remove or arrange for the removal of oil
unless it was determined that the owner or operator of the responsible
facility or vessel would properly undertake the removal.4 3 The federal
government was entitled to recover the full amount of the costs it
incurred while cleaning up any oil spill which resulted from \Villful
negligence or misconduct within the knowledge of the owner.49 If the
government could not show willful negligence or misconduct, the
FWPCA provided for a specific dollar limit of liability for removal costs
based upon the type of facility or vessel.50 The removal costs included
any costs or expenses the government incurred when it restored or
replaced natural resources that were damaged or destroyed by the
42. See 33 U.S.C. §2004 (1994) (repealing 43 US.C. §§ 1811-1824 of the OSCA); 33
U.S.C. § 4302(m) (amending § J5J4(a) of the Deep\vater Port Act); id. § 8102(a)(l) (amending,
thenrepealingTAPAA, 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)).
Sec 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1276.
43.
44. Sec id. Prior to the passage of the OPA, the FWPCA \Vas the sole federal \a\V that
allowed for the recovery ofdamages after oil spills.
45. See id. § 1321.
46. Id.§ 1321(Q(I), (Q(2).
47. United States v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 939 E Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. La
1996). The OPA amended the F\VPCA to require such efforts and to expand the oversight and
cleanup responsibilities ofthe federal government. The OPA also increased potential liabilities of
responsible parties and significantly broadened financial responsibility requirements. Id.
48. See33 U.S.C. § 132l(c)(l), (e)(3).
See id.§ 1321(1)(1).
49.
See id§ 132J(f)(l)-(f)(3).
50.
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discharge of oil. 11 Ho\vever, the o\vner or operator could avoid liability

for those removal costs if it could establish that the discharge of oil \Vas
caused solely by an act of God, an act of \Var, negligence on the part of
52
the United States, or an act or omission of a third party.
Under the F\VPCA, private parties could not recover damages or
cleanup costs caused by an oil spill from a vessel."'1 Private parties

usually had to recover their losses under maritime tort principles.54
Consequently, in order to recover for damages caused by an oil discharge,
the private plaintiff had to establish culpable negligence.55 The right of
recovery \Vas commonly based upon damage to property in which the
claimant had a proprietary interest.'6 In the absence of such an interest,
the private party did not have a right of action to recover for purely
economic losses or losses caused by interference \vith contractual
rights. 5' An exception to this general principle was recognized in favor of
fishermen. 5a The fact that private parties had to rely on tort principles to
establish liability for marine pollution damages \vas a major weakness in

the application of the FWPCA."
The 1972 FWPCA amendments were subsequently amended by the
Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1977.09 Although those amendments have
undergone substantial changes, they largely remain in force today. 61 The
CWA specifically prohibits "the discharge of any oil or hazardous
substances in or upon the navigable waters of the United States, its
shorelines, or its contiguous zone subject to certain limited exceptions."62
The 1977 amendments to the Act increased the liability limits for

seagoing vessels from $100 per gross registered ton (GRT) to $150 per
GRT and removed the $14 million ceiling on liability.03 Under the CWA,
states that had been affected by a discharge of oil are allowed to act
\vhere necessary to remoye such discharge and to be reimbursed, from
51.

See id.§ 1321(f)(4).
See id.§ 132l(f)(l).
See id.§ 1321(o)(l).
Edgar Gold, Afarine Pollution Liability After ''Exxon Villdez": The US. ''.411-0r
iVothing" Lotte!}'!, 22 J. MAR. L. & Co:.1., 423, 435 (1991); see also In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc.,
791ESupp.669. 674 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
55. See Cleveland Tankers, 191 F. Supp. at674.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Conner v. Aerovox, Inc., 730 E2d 835 (!st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1050 (1985).
58. See Union Oii Co. v. Oppen, SOI E2d 567 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. Gold, ;,..upra note 54, at 436.
60. See33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1297 (1994).
61. See id.
62. Id.§ 1321(h)(3).
63. Id.§ 1321(!)(1).
52.
53.
54.
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the fund established under section 132l(k) of the FWPCA, for the
reasonable costs incurred in the removal. 54 A key wealrness of the CWA
is that it fails to establish effective preventive and immediate response
mechanisms which would prevent spills altogether or provide for a
prompt response that is critical in limiting the effects ofa spill. "1
B.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and

LiabilityAct
CERCLA was passed in 1980 to provide a broad system of
liabilities and responsibilities for damages arising from the release of
hazardous substances into the environment.66 The term "environment''

includes the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the
ocean waters in which the natural resources are under the exclusive
67
management of the United States. The Act imposes liability upon the
owner or operator of vessels used to transport hazardous substances to
disposal or treatment sites. fs
CERCLA regulates discharges ofhazardous substances onto land or
into groundwater.~' According to the statute, the term "hazardous
substance" does not include petroleum (including crude oil, or any
fraction thereof) \Vhich is not otherwise specifically listed or designated
as a l1azardous substance.1{) Therefore, liability for discharges of oil from
71
vessels into marine environments are not covered by CERCLA.

64. The OPA repealed section (k) of the F\VPCA. Additionally, the OPA authorizes the
transfer of revenues remaining in the F\VPCA fund to the fund established by the OPA. See id.
§ 2002(b)(2).
65. The OPA's purpose \vas not to supplant the C\VA's governance over oil discharges, but
to provide more extensive and effective legislative means ofdealing \vith oil spills by doing things
like establishing Coast Guard response teams and requiring the use ofdouble hull tankers.
66. See42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
67.
Id§ 9601(8).
68.
Id. § 9607(a).
69.
See id.§ 9602.
70.
Id.§ 9601(8), (14).
71. Under the OPA, the term "oil" refers to all types of petroleum, crude, and fuel oil not
covered in section 101(14) ofCERCLA. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (1994). By defining the tenn in
that manner, Congress intended to give the OPA the "broadest possible coverage \vithout causing
confusion and conflict with CERCLA, which is limited to hazardous substances excluding oil and
other fonns of petroleum." Damon L. Vickers, Deterrence or Prevention--T1t'O Afeans of
Environmental Protection: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Oregon Serrate Bill
242, 28 \VILLAMEITE L. REV. 405, 406 (1992); Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Cone\vago Contractors, Inc.,
No. 4:CV-93-1995, 1994 \VL 539326, at *12 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
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Source Specific Legislation

CERCLA and the CWA are t\vo major pieces of federal
environmental legislation of general application. Other federal statutes
of more limited application have, in the past, governed pollution located
in certain geographic areas or pollution resulting from certain activities.
2
These statutes are referred to as source-specific legislation.7 As source
specific pollution hazards \Vere identified, Congress passed special
measures to deal \vith those hazards. 73 The three main statutes enacted to
deal \Vith oil pollution \Vere the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act,
the Deep,vater Port Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 74
1.

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (TAPAA) was
the first la\V enacted supplementing section 311 of the FWPCA.' 5 The
Act imposes strict liability for damages caused by marine spills ofAlaska
crude oil transported through the Trans-Alaska pipeline and loaded onto
76
vessels at the pipeline temrinal. The TAPAA established a $100 million
fund by imposing a tax on all oil transported through the Trans-Alaska
pipeline.77 The fund can be used to finance or reimburse cleanup costs
for oil spills occurring from oil transported along, or in the vicinity of,
the pipeline,'0 including oil from vessels loaded at the pipeline's terminal
facilities.'" The TAPAA fund can also be used to compensate for
damages in excess of the government's cleanup costs, including natural
resource damages and private property and economic damages. so Vessel
o\vners are strictly liable for the first $14 million of all such cleanup costs
and other damages. ' 1 The fund may be used to cover the remainder of the
82
costs up to $100 million per incident.

72. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675.
73.
Id.
74. l\ofany of the provisions of those statutes \Vere affected or consolidated by the OPA.
See43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1994); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1024; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1333.
75. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655.
76.
See id.§ 1653(c).
77. Id.§ 1653(c)(5).
78. Id.§ 1653(a)(l).
79. Id.§ 1653(c)(l).
80. Id.§ 1653(a)(l).
81. Id.§ 1653(c)(3).
82. Id.
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The Deepv•iater Port Act

On January 3, 1975, the President signed the Deep\vater Port Act of
1974 (DWPA)." The purpose of the DWPA was to establish a licensing
and regulatory program go\'erning offshore deep\vater port development
beyond the territorial limits and off the coast of the United States.04 Such
facilities would be used to transfer oil and natural gas supplies
transported b:y tanker to and from states of the United States.s5 D\VPA
makes the O\vner or operator of a vessel or the licensee of a deepwater
ports" liable for cleanup costs and damages resulting from oil spilled from
deep\vater ports, from vessels carrying oil from a deepwater port, or
from any \'Cssel located in a deep\vater port's safety zone. 81 A deep\vater
port safety zone is "the safety zone established around a deep\.vater port
as determined by the Secretary." ~ Relying upon the DWPA, the
government can recover natural resources damages for injury to the
marine environment.39 The D\VPA also extends recovery rights to
90
individuals and allo\.vs the United States Attorney General to pursue
class actions for property damages. 91
8

3.

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA)
established federal jurisdiction over submerged lands on the continental
shelf beyond three miles from the coastline. 92 In 1978, \.Vith the increased
risk of damage to marine and coastal environments caused by expanded
development of oil and gas resources on the outer continental shelf
(OCS), the OCSLA of 1953 \Vas amended. 93 The amendment imposed
strict liability for oil spills on O\.vners and operators of any offshore

83.
See33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1994).
84.
Sec id.§ 150l(b).
85.
S. REP. No. 93-1217, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7529, 7531.
86. A deepwater port is defined as any fL'\:ed or floating manmade structure other than a
vessel, or any group of such structures, located beyond the territorial sea and off the coast of the
United States and \Vhich are used, or intended for use, as a port or terminal for the loading and
further handling of oil for transportation to any state. See 33 U.S.C. § 1502(9).
87.
See id.§ l518(a)(3)(A).
88.
Id.§ 1502(16).
89.
See id.§ 1517(1)(3).
90.
Sec id.§ 1515(a).
Sccid.
91.
92.
Sce43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1333 (1994).
93.
See id.§ 1801.
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facility located on the OCS94 and on vessels carrying oil from the OCS.

95

The United States has jurisdiction over oil spills that occur on the
96

continental shelf beyond three miles from the coastline. Individual
coastal states have jurisdiction over submerged lands within the three

mile limit.97

Individuals or the United States Attorney General can

recover damages for economic losses arising out of or directly resulting
from oil pollution. ~
9

III. THEOPAAND!TSLIABILITYSCHEME

A.

Legislative History ofthe OPA

Prior to 1990, \Vhenever there was an oil spill, the parties involved
had to rely on the various legal regimes discussed in the previous Part of
this Article to determine liability. Those regimes formed a hodgepodge
of sometimes conflicting laws concerning liability for oil discharges.
Matters \Vere further complicated by the assorted state statutes pertaining

to oil spill liability, which had widely different standards. Congress,
recognizing the conflicts and the deficiencies in the existing laws,
directed the Attorney General to study the matter and to make
recommendations for legislation that would provide a comprehensive
system of oil spill liability.w The Attorney General completed a study
that \vas entitled Methods and Procedures for Implementing a Unifonn
Law Providing for Cleanup Costs and Damages Caused by Oil Spills
from Ocean Related Sources. 100 Based upon this study, the Attorney
General submitted his report. 101 In an attempt to have the recommenda
tions of that report implemented, President Gerald Ford forwarded
proposed legislation to Congress. 102
Despite presidential pressure, Congress did not pass the
comprehensive oil legislation urged by the report. 103 Nonetheless, most
members of Congress agreed that a more comprehensive system needed
94. The OCS is "all submerged lands lying seavvard and outside the area beneath
navigable \vaters and of\vhich the subsoil and seabed appertain to the US and are subject to its
jurisdiction and control." Id.§ 1331(a)(l).
95. See id§ 1801.
96. See id.
97. See id§§ 1301, 1331(a).
98. See id.§ 1813(b)(4).
99. See \Valter B. Jones, Oil Compensation and Liability Legislation: 1Vhen Good Things
Don'tHappen to Good Bills, 19ENVIL. L. REP. 10,333, 10,334(1989).
100. Id.
101. Seeid.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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to be put in place. io.1 The problems arose because the members disagreed

about the type of provisions that legislation should contain. 10s Conse

quently, for several years, Congress considered some comprehensive oil
spill measures to combine all state and federal oil liability la\vs into a
uniform national program. rn 6 \Vhile several comprehensive measures
were approved in the House, the Senate could not agree on any of those

measures. 107 This legislative gridlock prevented any comprehensive
legislation from being enacted. 100
Persons who wanted Congress to enact some type of far-reaching
statute to deal with oil pollution were reinvigorated when the EXXON
VALDEZ oil spill occurred in Mai'ch of 1989. 109 Even persons \vho had
previously opposed a comprehensive oil pollution act jumped on the
bandwagon when the true depth ofthe damage caused by the oil spill was
exposed. 1w By August 1989, oil had traversed nearly ten thousand square
miles of water in Prince William Sound and the Gulf ofAlaska. 1 u More
than twelve hundred miles of shoreline \vas oiled, causing serious
112
IVIillions of
damage to the many natural resources of the area.
Americans saw images on the nightly news of cleanup cre\VS tolling on
miles of oil covered beaches, dead otters washing ashore, and birds
struggling to fly with their black matted feathers. 113 The oil spill
compelled the state of Alaska to cancel its fishing season in Prince
William Sound, bringing untold financial hardship to those \Vhose
livelihood depended on the ocean. 114

The EXXON VALDEZ oil spill highlighted the inadequacies of the
legal regime existing at that time and raised the level of national concern.

In addition, only months after the EXXON VALDEZ incident, three large
spills occurred in rapid succession in distant locations, dumping a total of
almost one million gallons of additional oil into the nation's aquatic

104. Seeid.
105. J.V. Ruhl & Michael J. Jewell, Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Opening a New Era. in
Federal and Texas Regulation ofOil Spill Prevention, Containment and Cleanup, and Liability, 32
S. TEX. L. RE\( 475, 478-80 (1991).
106. Id.
107. SeeS. REP. No. 101-94, at l, 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722.
108. Seeid.
109. Bryan Hodgson, Alaska s Big Spill-Can The Wilderness Heal?, NA'.r'L GEOGRAPHIC,
Jan. 1990, at 8, cited in Elizabeth R Millard, Anatomy ofan Oil Spill: The Exxon V.aldez and the
Oil Pollution Act of1990, 18 SETONHALLLEGIS. J. 331, 346 (1993).
110. See Hodgson, supra note 109, at 8.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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environment. 110 \Vithin a t\.venty-four hour period, on June 23 and 24,
1989, the Greek-registered tanker \\TORLD PRODIGY struck a rock and
spilled O\'er 290,000 gallons of heating oil into Naragansett Bay in
Ne\vport, Rhode Island, the oil tanker RACHEL B. collided \vith an oil
tanker in the Houston Ship Channel, spilling over 250,000 gallons of

heavy crude oil, and over 300,000 gallons of heating oil \Vas spilled into
the Dela\vare River \Vhen the Uruguayan-registered tanker PRESIDENT
RIVERA ran aground. 116
The EXXON VALDEZ incident, in combination \Vith three other

spills that occurred that same year, provided the driving force for a
revamped oil spill la\v. The public outcry follo\ving the disaster forced

Congress to make a concerted effort to President George Bush \Vith
comprehensi,,e legislation that dealt \\'ith the threat oil spills pose to the
nation's \Vaters. 111 As a result, on August 18, 1990, sixteen months and
t\venty-five days after the EXXON VALDEZ grounded in Prince
\Villiam Sound, President George Bush finall)' signed the OPA into law. 118
The OPA specifically prohibited tank \'essels that had spilled more than
one million gallons of oil into the marine environment after March 22,
1989, from operating on the navigable \Vaters of Prince William Sound."~
This provision \Vas an attempt to ensure that vessels like the one that
caused the EXXON VALDEZ spill could never transport oil in the area
again. 1:u

B.

The Liability Scheme ofthe OPA

The OPA's provisions dealing \vith liability are located in Title I of
the Act. 121 The OPA neither preempts state la\v 122 nor implements the
121
international protocols. It expands the liability and limitation programs
of former la\vs and addresses particular concerns respecting prevention,
removal, and ci\ril penalty programs. The la\V channels liability to
designated parties and pro\'ides a fund to be used as compensation for
catastrophic losses and for claims \vhich are not compensated by
115. Seu H.R. REP. No. 101-1018, at 36 (1990).
116. Id.
117. Sec ii.filla:rd, supm note 109, at 339-43.
118. Sccid.
119. See33 U.S.C. § 2737 (1994).
120. Seeid.
121. Id. §§2701-2720.
122. The OPA does not preempt "state la\vs of a scope similar to the matter contained in
Title I ofOP1\." \Villiams >:Potomac Elcc. Po\Yer Co., 115 E Supp. 2d 561, 565 (D. l\1d. 2000).
123. See generally Protocol of 1984 to Amend the Intemational Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 15 J. l\1AR. L. & Co:..i. 613 (1984).
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dischargers. Courts have concluded that Congress did not intend the
124

OPA to bar the imposition of additional liability by the States.
Vlhen Congress initially considered oil spill liability legislation, the
focus was solely on liability for oil spills and compensation ensuing after

a spill occurred.

The EXXON VALDEZ situation highlighted the

magnitude of possible spills and demonstrated that prevention of a spill
should be the primary goal of oil spill legislation. Accordingly, under the
OPA, the liability and compensation regime found in previous oil spill

bills

\Vas

expanded to include substantial pre\'ention and improved

planning provisions. 125 The key issues involving the OPA are (1) \vhen
the Act applies, (2) who is liable under the Act, (3) what are the limits of
that liability, (4) what are the defenses to that liability, and (5) \Vhat
damages are recoverable under the Act.
C.

Applicability ofthe GPA

Plaintiffs have tried to get tI1e courts to apply the OPA to any
situation involving an oil spill. 1' 6 Thus, one of the most litigated issues
involving the OPA is v. hether the Act applies to a specific situation. The
OPA applies v.,rhenever there is a discharge, or a substantial threat of a
discharge, of oil onto adjoining shorelines, into water \vithin the
exclusive economic zone of the United States, or into or upon the
navigable v.1aters of the United States. 1' 1 The terms key to the
determination of whether a claim exists under the OPA are: "adjoining
shorelines," "exclusive economic zone;' and "navigable \Vaters." 11"
Unless the discharge of oil harms, or threatens to harm, one of these
areas, the OPA does not apply to the situation. 129
The term "adjoining shorelines" is not defined in the Act; ho\vever,
courts have given the term its obvious meaning. 130 "Exclusive economic
zone (EEZ)" is defined by the Act as ''the zone established by
Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030 . . . including the ocean
1

124. See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630-31 (1st Cir. 1994)
(using the OPA to support validity of state liability statute permitting recovery for purely
economic loss); 33 U.S.C. § 271S(a)(2).
125. Cynthia M. \Vilkinson et al., Slick Work: A1l Analysis ofthc Oil Pollution Act of
1999, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES& ENYIL. L. 181, 189 (1992).
126. Sec SWI Pipe Linc Co. v. Conewago Contractors, fuc., No. 4:C\1-93-1995, 1994 \VL
539326, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (refusing to apply the OPA to a spill of 12,000 gallons of
petroleum on a golf course).
127. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a); see A.F. Bessemer Clark, The US. Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
LLOYD'sM\R. & Co:...L L.Q., May 1991, at 247.
128. 33 U.S.C. § 2701.
129. See Sun Pipe Line, 1994 \VL 539326, at *2.
130. See Gatlin Oil Co. \'United States, 169 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. I 999).
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\Vaters of the areas referred to as 'eastern special areas' in Article 3(1) of

the Agreement between United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, signed June 1,
1990."01 Typically, the EEZ refers to the coastal \vaters surrounding the
United States, extending sea\vard for a distance of t\vo hundred miles
from the United States coastline. 1n
Most of the litigation dealing \vith the applicability of the OPA

involves the definition of"navigable \vater." The OPA defines "navigable
\Vaters" as "the \Vaters of the United States."03 Very few cases have
addressed directly the term "\vaters of the United States" as used in the
OPA, but courts have interpreted the term as defined in the CWA. 134 In
its regulations, the EPA (the agency charged with enforcing the OPA)
defines the term as including "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, \vetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, \Vet meado\vs, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
cornmerce."13s
The go\1ernment has contended that the term "navigable waters"
under the OPA should be interpreted similar to the \vay the term has been
136
construed under the CWA. The most recent court to address the issue
agreed \vith the government and concluded that "'\vaters of the United
States' as used in the OPA means all \vaters and wetlands, not necessarily
navigable \\raters." 131 Ho\vever, even though courts have found that the
OPA and the CWA should receive similar constructions, courts have
ultimately concluded that the OPA's legislative history requires a
narro\ver reading ofthe Act. ns Therefore, some link, direct or indirect, to
33 u.s.c. § 2701(8).
Jaffe & Rodriguez, supra note 33, at 12 n.69.
33 U.S.C. § 2701(21).
See United States v. Riverside Bayvie\v Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-39 (1985);
see also Viii. ofOconomO\\"OC Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 964-65 (7th Cir. 1994)
(describing in both cases the term "\vaters ofthe United States" as used in the Clean Water Act in
broad tenns).
135. Guidelines for Specifications or Disposable Sites for Dredged or Filled Material, 40
C.ER. § 230.3(s)(3) (1999).
136. The government has asserted that the term ''waters of the United States" describes
obviously navigable \vaters, and all \Vaters and \\"etlands, including those that are not navigable or
directly connected to navigable \Wier. See United States v. Mizhir Oil Co., 106 E Supp. 2d 124,
125 (D. Mass. 2000).
137. Sceid.
138. One court concluded that the defendant's oil fields \Vere "fields located so far from
oceans, bays, shores, or beaches that any dischruge of oil is simply too attenuated a ducat to
'navigable \\'liters,' to be covered by the OPA." Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d
820, 827 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
131.
132.
133.
134.
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United States coastal or inland \vatenvays must be demonstrated to
invoke the protections of the OPA. While the discharge, or threat of
discharge, need not take place in, or on, a CO\'Cred body of \Vater, there

must be some threat that the oil \vill make its \Vay into protected areas
like coastal or inland waterways. 1>9

D.

Liability Under the GPA

In order to be liable under the OPA, the person or organization must
be a responsible party. ~ Responsible parties are ovvners and operators 141
1 0

of vessels, onshore facilities, offshore facilities, and pipelines and
licensees of deepwater ports. 1• 2 In the case of an abandoned vessel,
facility, deep\vater port or pipeline, the persons \vho would ha\'C been
responsible parties immediately prior to the abandonment arc liable. 143
The OPA does not limit the number of responsible parties. By giving the
term "responsible party" a broad definition, Congress made sure that
more than one party could be held accountable for the costs of pollution
stemming from oil spills. 144
Discharges from public vessels are expressly excluded from the
OPA cost recovery scheme. 14' The OPA defines a "public vessel" as "a
\'essel O\Vned or bareboat chartered and operated by the United States." 1" 6
Therefore, O\vncrs and operators of public facilities and vessels are
excluded, for the most part, from the OPA's liability scheme. ~ Other
excluded discharges are those allo\ved by a pennit issued under federal,
state or local la\v and those from an onshore facility \Vhich is subject to
1 7

139. Sec Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Cone\vago Coniractors. Inc., No. 4:CV-93-1995, 1994 \VL
539326, at *13 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
140. See33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
141. The OPA defines an "operator" of a facility as a person "operating such onshore
facility." Id.§ 2701(26). In interpreting a similar definition of"operator" under CERCLA, the
Supreme Court held that to be an "operator" \vithin the meaning of the statute, the defendant
"must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution." United States "
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998). Relying upon that decision, the court determined that a
person \Vas not an "operator," under OPA, if the pernon did not play any role in the direct
operation of those aspects of the oil reclaiming plant \Vhich led to the alleged discharges of oil.
1-Iarris v. Oil Reclaiming Co., 94 E Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Kan. 2000).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (32)(A)-(E).
143. Id.§ 2701(32)(F).
144. Sec id.§ 2701(32)(A)-(F); sec also United States\'. Bois D'Arc Oper.>ting Corp., No.
98-157, 1999\VL 130635, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 10, 1999).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(2).
146. Id.§ 2701(29).
147. See id.§ 2702(c)(2).
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the TAPAA. 1•1' The OPA does not consider the o\vner of the oil to be a
responsible party. 1"''1
E.

Reco11ery Under the GPA

1.

Removal Costs

The responsible party is liable for all removal costs and damages. 150
Removal costs are defined to include the costs of removal incurred after
a discharge of oil. 151 In addition, remo\'al costs cover costs to prevent, '
minimize, or mitigate oil pollution \Vhen there is a substantial threat of a
discharge of oil. 15z
T\VO types of removal costs are compensable lUlder the OPA:
(1) removal costs incurred by a governmental entity, 113 and (2) any
remo,,al costs incurred by any other person \vhile taking actions that are
consistent \vith the National Contingency Plan (NCP). 15-1 The NCP is the
set of regulations governing the administration of the government's
response to en\'ironrnental hazards. 15s The NCP serves as a guide to
regulators and regulated parties in the enforcement, administration, and
interpretation of en\'ironmental la\vs, including the OPA. 1'" The NCP
regulations deal \vith issues like the preliminary assessment and initiation
of action b)' the appropriate government agencies after an oil spill. '> 1 The
NCP response plan for oil discharges outlines a four phase response
frame\vork.
The first phase of the plan requires any persons in charge of a
facility to notify the appropriate federal officials as soon as they discover
an unla\vful oil discharge." 8 If someone other than the person in charge
discovers the discharge, that person is required to notify the National
Response Center "as appropriate." 159 The second phase of the plan
requires the federal coordinator to assess the level of the threat and the
achievability of removal, to identify the responsible parties, to try to
148. Id. § 2702(c)(l ), (3).
149. Sec id.§ 2701(32).
150. Id. § 2702(a).
151. Id.§ 2701(31).
152. Id.
153. This includes a state government or a Native American tribe. Id.§ 2702(b)(l)(A).
154. Id.§ 2702(b)(l)(B).
155. See National Oil and 1-Ia;-.ardou.s Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.ER. pt.
300 (1999).
156. Sec id.
157. Sec United States\~ Conoco, Inc., 916 E Supp. 581, 584 (E.D. La. 1996).
158. Scc40 C.ER. § 300.300(b) (1999).
159. Sec id.§ 300.300(c).
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prompt the discharger to start voluntary removal actions, and to
otherv.rise "take appropriate response actions." ~ The third phase of the
1

plan instructs the coordinator to pursue containment, cleanup, and
disposal measures. 1" 1 The final phase of the plan deals \vith
documentation and cost recovery. 162
The OPA requires the United States to remove the discharged oil or
oversee the removal by others. 16i Thus, the United States is entitled to
recover its costs for directing and monitoring all actions to remove a
discharge 164 and the interest on unpaid removal costs. 165 Those removal
costs may also include attorneys' fees incurred to recover the money
expended by the Oil Spill Liability Fund from the responsible party. 1f'
Courts have concluded that Congress intended the enactment of the OPA
to supplant the existing general admiralty and maritime la\v, \Vhich
allo\ved punitive damages under certain circumstances in the area of oil
pollution. 167 Thus, punitive damages are not available under the OPA. 1n
Recoverable removal costs are not restricted to those incurred by the
federal government. 169 Private parties are afforded protection lUlder the
OPA for their cleanup costs, as long as their actions are consistent \vith
the NCP 110

2.

Recoverable Damages

As far as damages are concerned, the OPA is all-embracing.
Retoverable damages include: (1) natural resource damages, including
loss of use and reasonable assessment costs recoverable by a government
111
trustee; (2) damages to real or personal property, including economic
loss, recoverable by the owner or lessee of the property; 17' (3) damages
for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, regardless of O\vnership
160. See id.§ 300.305.
161. Seeid.§300.310.
162. Sec id. § 300.315.
163. "Removal" is defined as "containment and removal of oil or a hazardous substance
from \Hiter and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or
mitigate damage to the public health or \Velfare." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(30) (1999).
164. See United States v. Hyundai Merch. l\1arine Co., 172 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir.
1999), eerl. denied, 120 S. Ct 397 (1999).
165. Scc33 U.S.C. § 2705.
166. Sec Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1192-93.
167. See, e.g., S. Port Marine, L.L.C. v. Gulf Oil Ltd., 234 F.3d 58, 65 (!st. Cir. 2000).
168. Id.
169. Seeid.
170. Under the previous C\VA regime, liability to nonfederal parties could be based only
on a sho\ving offault. Sec Gold, supra note 54, at 435.
171. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (1994).
172. Id.§ 2702(b)(2)(B).

2001]

IS IT TIME TO CHANGE THE OPA?

115

or management; 17' (4) net losses of taxes, royalties, rents, fees or shares of
net profits, due to damage to property or natural resources recoverable by
114
a governmental entity; (5) damages for loss of profits, or impairment of
earning capacity, due to damage to property or natural resources; 111 and
(6) damages for the net costs of increased public senrices caused by a
176
discharge of oil.

3.

Natural Resource Damages
The EXXON VALDEZ spilled oil into one of the \Vorld's most

productive fisheries; the region \Vas abundant with \vildlife and unspoiled
by man's influence. 171 That tragedy caused the public to value natural
resources more and to recognize the importance of recouping the full
\'alue of lost natural resources. 17s As a result, natural resources 17' \Vere
considered to be of such importance that the;' were given a separate
section in the OPA. 1' 0 One of OPA's main goals is to make the
environment and the public \Vhole for injuries to natural resources and
services caused by a discharge of oil. ~
Under the OPA, natural resources are given a broad definition.
Specifically', natural resources include land, fish, \vildlife, biota, air,
\Yater, grollild \Yater, drinking \Yater supplies, and other such resources
belonging to, managed by, or held in trust by, or controlled by the United
States, any state, local government, Native American tribe or foreign
govemment. 1' 1 The resources of the exclusive economic zone are also
considered to be natural resources under the OPA. is'
Natural resource damages include the cost of restoring,
rehabilitating, replacing or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged
natural resources. i0-1 The damages also consist of the diminution in value
of the natural resources pending restoration, iss and the reasonable cost of
assessing those damages. 18' These damages are in addition to the removal
1

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
I 80.
ISL
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

1

Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
Id.§ 2702(b)(2)(E).
Id.§ 2702(b)(2)(F).
See Eyak Native \/ill. v. Ex,'\'.on Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 775 (defining the term "natural resources").
See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20).
Sec id. § 2706.
Natural Resources DamageAssessmtnl~ (NRDA), 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (1999).
33 u.s.c. § 2701(20).
Id.
Id.§ 2706(d)(l)(A).
Id. § 2706(d)(l)(B).
Id.§ 2706(d)(l)(C).
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and remediation \Vork normally conducted on contaminated sites under
the NCP. 1'7 Moreover, these claims are separate from criminal penalties,
188
civil penalties, and private civil damage payments. Ho\vever, the OPA
prohibits double recovery for damages for the same incident and natural
resources.
The most contro\'ersial aspect of natural resource damage recovery
is assessing the damages. Many economists and attorne:ys disagree on
the best method to use to determine the value of the natural resources lost
as the result of an oil spill. The t\vo primary components of that
valuation are use values and nonuse values.
Use values are measured by "the \Vorth of natural resources to
people \Nho use them." 190 Use values are readily quantifiable. For
example, as J.T. Smith II has observed in his article addressing natural
resource damages under OPA that "con\'entional economic techniques
can measure use values, such as foregone recreation opportunities due to
the oiling of a beach, or interruption of commercial or sport fishing." 1
On the contrary, the process of measuring nonuse values is complicated
because natural resources that humans do not consume or rely upon have
no conventional economic value. 192
The most common method used to quantify nonuse values is the
contingent valuation method (CVM). 193 Smith explains that "CVM is a
survey technique by which citizens are asked to respond to hypothetical
inquiries regarding their \Villingncss to pay for the preservation of a
particular resource." 1'1-l Based on the survey results, damages arc
calculated by multiplying the per-person valuation by the affected
population. 195 Again, Smith explains that "in the case of living resources
of more than merely local interest, such as marine mammals, the
multiplier may be huge." 190 Thus, the possibility of inflated damages is
the main criticism of this method of valuation.
1~9

·)1

187. Id.
188. Seeid.
189. Id.§ 2706(d)(3).
190. Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Yaluation, 42 VA..,,D. L. RE\'. 269, 281
(1981).
191. J.1: Smith II, Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA and OPA: Some Basics
for 1\1aritime Operators, IS TUL. MAR. L.I I, 3 (1993) (quoting Cross, supra note 190, at 281).
192. See id.
193. See RoBE!IT
MITCHELL & RICHARDT. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PuBLIC
GOODS: THECONT!NGENTVALU.'l'.l"lONMEl1iOD 2 (1989).
194. Smith, supra note 191, at 5.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 4.
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The OPA designates the difficult task of assessing the value of
natural resources to public trustees. 197 Trustees for natural resources are
officials of federal and state governments, Native American tribes, and
foreign governments. i% For the most part, the Secretaries of the Interior,
Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, and Energy act as federal trustees. 19)
At the state level, governors designate the state and local government
trustees." 0" State departments of land management, fish and game
management, and attorney generals offices typically act as state
201
trustees.
In order to offer some guidance to the trustees, the OPA called for
the NOAA to \vrite regulations governing Natural Resource Damage
Assessments (NRDAs)102 for oil spills. Even though these NRDAs
regulations \Vere to be promulgated \vithin t\vo years of the passage of
the OPA, NOAA \Vas slo\V in starting the process."03 Thus, trustees
seeking direction had to rely upon the CERCLA rule for oil spills into
navigable \Vaters. 2
On January 5, 1996, NOAA published its long-awaited final NRDA
rule in the Federal Register. 2-05 NOAA's NRDA rule superseded the
CERCLA rule published by the Department of Interior. 2G" After February
5, 1996, in order to seek rebuttable presumption status for oil spill
NRDAs, the trustee has to rely upon NOAA's rule." 01 Ho\vever, the
CERCLA rule applies to spills of mixtures of oil \Vith hazardous
substances. 2-0'
Pursuant to the OPA, if the trustee follows the NOAA's rule, he
receives an administrative and judicial "rebuttable presumption" for the
evidence underlying his damage assessment."m Thus, the administration
agency, or the court, presumes that he used the correct factors to
(>;

197. SccNRDA, 15 C.ER. § 990.11 (1999).
198. Id.
199. Sec Natural Resource DamageA<:sessments (NIWA), 61 Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 5, 1996)
(to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990).
200. Id.
201. Seeid.
202. See id. (describing thi.: use ofNRDA<: in dealing \vith the August 10, 1993, Mullet
Keyframpa Bay spill \vhcrein 32,000 gallons of Jct A fuel, diesel, and gas ,\·ere discharged into

Jo1•:erTampa Bay).
203. OPt\ required promulgation of such regulations by August 18, 1992, t\\'O years after
enactment. Sec 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(l) (1994).
204. See43 C.F.R. § 11.10(1994).
205. SeeNRDA, 61 Fed. Reg. at 440.
206. SeeNRDA, 15 C.F.R. § 990.11 (1999).
207. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(2).
208. NRDA, 15 C.ER. § 990.20(a)-(c).
209. Scc33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(2).
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calculate the damages.

Consequently, the spiller has the burden of

sho\ving that the trustee's damage assessment is not appropriate. When
assessing damages, a trustee is not required to use the procedures set out
in the NOAA rule. 2 rn But, if he uses a different procedure, his damage
assessment is not afforded a rebuttable presumption and the trustee has to
prove that his assessment is accurate. 211 Even if they use the NOAA rule,
foreign trustees' results do not get a rebuttable presumption. 212

Under the NOAA rule, the only obligation that the responsible
parties have is to pay claims.213 Thus, the ovmers and operators of
facilities and vessels are not required to participate in assessment or
restoration planning before or after an oil spill. Nonetheless, the
regulations outline options for O\Vners and operators to participate in pre
spill planning and post-spill assessments, planning and restoration. ~
NOAA's rule provides a new way to address injuries resulting from
many small oil spills in an area. In the past, NOAA ignored small spills
\Vhere assessment costs were too high relative to restoration cost. 215 To
address that problem, the ne\V rule allo\VS regional restoration plans.216
Hence, the cumulative injuries and lost uses from many small spills can
211
be addressed through a single area-wide restoration effort. As a result,
an indi\ridual spiller may pay for its part of a larger restoration plan. This
ensures that the damages caused by small oil spills are remedied.
NOAA's rule sets forth a three-phase process to prepare NRDAs. 218
The first phase is the pre-assessment phase, during \Vhich trustees
determine \Vhether to pursue restoration.2 19 In the second phase, the
restoration planning phase, the trustees evaluate information on potential
injuries and use that information to determine the need for, type of, and
scale of restoration.2' 0 The focus of that second phase determines if an
injury has occurred,211 and quantifies the degree, and spatial and temporal
During the final phase, the restoration
extent, of the injury.n 2
21

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Sec id.
See id.

See 15 C.F.R. § 990.13.
See id.§ 990.14.
Sec id.§ 990.J4(c)(l).
NRDA, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 444 (Jan. 5, 1996) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
Seeid.
Id.
See15 C.F.R. § 990.12.
Id.
Id.
Id.§ 990.51.
See id. § 990.52.
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implementation phase, the trustees ensure that the restoration plan is
implemented.ll.'

4.

Economic Damages

The OPA deals directly \vith the issue of the economic impact of an
oil spill. The Act expressly recognizes recovery by private parties of
economic losses, lost profits and impairment of earning capacity due to
224
an oil spill incident The legislative history of the OPA suggests that
physical injury does not need to accompany a proprietary interest in
order for the claimant to recover economic damages. 225
Under the OPA, the class of claimants that can recover economic
226
losses may be limited, as the claimant must have suffered some type of
foreseeable loss. 221 Application of this principle is demonstrated in In re

Cleveland Tankers, Inc. 228
In Cleveland Tankers, the MN JUPITER was unloading gasoline at
a dock in the Sagina\v River in Bay City, Michigan, when it caught fire
and spilled gasoline into the river. ~ The ship partially sank and the
Coast Guard closed the channel.230 Several parties \Vhose business
interests \Vere adversely affected by the clOsure, but did not suffer any
property damage, filed claims under the OPA against the owner of the
vessel. 2" The court held that the OPA does not allo\v recovery for
economic loss if the claimant does not allege "injury, destruction, or
loss" to his property.2) 2
This need to sho\v some type of loss or injury to property may serve
to limit the number ofpotential claimants.2)) Nevertheless, another court
has held that the claimant stated a cause of action under the OPA when it
lost its right to drill for oil under its platform because of the responsible
party's oil spill.234 In reaching its decision, the court focused on the fact
22

223. Seeid.§990.
224. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) (1994).
225. SeeH.R CoNF. REP. No. 101-653, at 103 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
781.
226. See In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 E Supp. 669 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 670-71.
230. Id. at 671.
231. ld.at67L
232. Id.at619.
233. See Cameron H. Totten, Note, Recovery for Economic Loss Under Robins Dry Dock
and the Oil Act of 1990: Sekco Energy, Inc. v. MN Margaret Chouest, 18 TUL. MAR. L.J. 167,
174-75 (1993).
234. See Sekco Energy, Inc. v. MN Margaret Chouest, No. CIY. A.92-0420, 1993 \VI..
322942,at *I, *5 (E.D. La.Aug. 13, 1993).
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that the claimant had an o\vnership interest in the platform and did not
give much consideration to the fact that the claimant's property, the
platform, had not sustained any physical darnage. 23s
The OPA's economic damage provisions can be applied in a manner
that is fair to all parties involved. This can be accomplished if the courts,
in applying the OPA, define some reasonable and predictable limitation
upon \Vhich claimants may base their claims for recovery of economic
losses. Ultimately, the boundaries ofthe OPA's economic remedy may be
derived from traditional causation principles and a strict adherence to
"loss of profits and impairment of earning capacity" as the measure of
216
recovery. Such an approach \vould permit recovery of damages by any
claimant whose business enterprise was so directly intemvined \vith the
damaged property or resource that the claimant sustained immediate and
predictable economic consequences.

E

Defenses to Liability

The OPA enumerates limited defenses to liability. A responsible
party is not liable for removal costs and damages if the discharge \Vas
"solely" caused by an act of God,n 7 an act of \Var, an act or omission of a
third party, or a combination of those things. 238 The responsible party has
the burden of establishing these limited defenses. 239
The QPA provides for third-party liability consistent \Vith the
liability of the responsible party when the responsible party establishes
that the discharge was solely caused by the act or omission of the third
party.240 In that instance, the third party may be treated as a responsible
party.241 Third-part)' is narrowly defined to exclude an employee or agent
of the responsible party or of a party \Vho acts pursuant to a contract \vith
the responsible party. ~ The responsible party must also establish its o\vn
due care and precaution as to foreseeable third-party acts and
consequences.24i A claimant whose gross negligence or \villful mis2 2

235. See id. at *3.
236. See Cleveland Tankers, 791 E Supp. at 678.
237. "'[A]ct of God' means an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the effects of,vhich could not
have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight" 33 U.S.C. ~ 2701(1)
(1994).
238. Id.§ 2703(a)(l)-(4).
239. Sec id.
240. Sec id.§ 2702(d)(I)(A).
241. Id.
242. See id.§ 2703(a)(3).
243. Seeid.
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conduct caused the incident does not have a cause of action under the

OPA2 ''
These defenses are not available if the responsible party fails or
refuses: (1) to report an incident required by la\v, (2) to pro\'ide
reasonable assistance requested by a responsible official in connection
\·vith the removal activities, or (3) to compl)' \Vith an order issued under
the F\VPCA provisions or other federal statutes \Vithout sufficient
cause.
2~1

G.

Limits on Liability

In response to the concerns of persons in the shipping and oil
industries, in the final \'ersion of the OPA, Congress set ne\v limits on the
statutory liability and remo\'al costs incurred by the responsible party.''~
Under the OPA, a party's liability is limited in accordance \Vith the type
247
and size of vessel or facility• involved in the spill. One Court concluded
that "the congressional decision to limit a \'essel O\vner's liability under
the OPA is firmly rooted in economic theory." 248
Under the OPA, the O\vner of a large vessel is exposed to much
greater liability than the o\vner of a small vessel."' 9 This liability scheme
exposes the party \Vho is in the position to obtain the most benefit from
25
maritime commerce to the greatest amount of liability. ° For instance,
the o\vner of a large cargo vessel receives a greater benefit from the
\'essel's commercial activity than the O\vner of the tug boat \.vhich assists
\vith the cargo's vessel's docking procedure.251 Thus, the owner of the
large vessel is in a better position to safeguard against an oil spill or to
bear the cost of a spill. By putting the greatest risks of operating a vessel
in the navigable \Vaters upon those \·vho receive the greatest benefits from
doing so, the OPA's liability scheme allo\.·vs the costs associated \vith oil
spills to be spread among all those \.vho benefit from maritime
commerce, including those \Vho consume products \.Vhich are shipped
252
from o\•erseas.

244. Sec id.§ 2703(b).
245. Id.§ 2703(c)(l)-(3).
246. Sec id.§ 2704.
247. See id. § 2704(a).
248. Nat'! Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia (NSCSA) v. Moran !vlid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp.
1436, 1447 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1996).
249. Scc33 U.S.C. § 2704(a).
250. NSCSA, 924 F. Supp. at 1447, n.6.
251. Seeid.
252. See id.
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For a tank vessel, the responsible party's liability is limited to the
greater of$1200 per gross ton2' 3 or $10,000,000 (if vessel is greater than
3,000 gross tons)~ or $2,000,000 (if vessel is 3,000 tons or less)."' The
recovery for damages caused by a nontank vessel is limited to the greater
of $600 per gross ton or $500,000.256 When the oil spill involves an
offshore facility other than a deepwater port, the responsible party's
257
liability is limited to the tot.al of all removal costs plus $75,000,000.
The liability limit for an oil spill caused by an onshore facility and
deep\\'ater port is $350,000,000.253
The responsible party cannot limit his liability under the OPA if the

oil spill was proximately caused by the gross negligence or \villful
misconduct of the responsible party, its agent, employee, or person acting
pursuant to a contract with the responsible party.259 In addition, if the oil
spill is caused because one of those parties violated a federal safety,
construction, or operation regulation, the responsible party cannot limit
260
his liability under the statute.
Additionally, there is no limitation available if a responsible party
who knows, or has reason to know, of the incident refuses or fails to
report it. 261 The limitations also do not apply if the responsible party
refuses or fails to provide reasonable cooperation and assistance
requested by a responsible official in coIUiection \vith removal
262
activities. The responsible party cannot utilize the limitations if he or
she fails, without sufficient cause, to comply with orders issued under the
OPA or other federal statutes.263
In order to not appear to be catering to big industry, Congress
expanded some liability under the OPA. Congress accomplished this by
dealing with the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act of 1851
(I.LA).'" The LLA was passed to encourage shipbuilding and induce
investment into the shipping industry by limiting the liability of ship
owners.26 ' Under the LLA, a party could enjoin all pending suits and
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(l )(A).
Id.§ 2704(a)(l)(B)(i).
Id.§ 2704(a)(l)(B)(ii).
Id. § 2704(a)(2).
Id. § 2704(a)(3).
Id.§ 2704(a)(4).
See id. § 2704(c)(l)(A).
See id.§ 2704(c)(l)(B).
See id.§ 2704(c)(2)(A).
See id.§ 2704(c)(2)(B).
See id. § 2704{c)(2)(C).
See46 U.S.C.App. §§ 181-195 (!994).
See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214 (1927).
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compel them to be filed in a special limitation proceeding in order to
limit its liability to the value of the vessel and any freight pending.266
In the years prior to the passage of the OPA, the appropriateness of
the LLA \Vas questioned. For example, one court indicated that the LLA
\Vas merely "'a relic ofan earlier era."261 Further, legislative schemes were
devised to supersede the LLA and set more realistic liability limits when
addressing an oil spill \vith a major envirorunental impact. ~
The Senate report accompanying the OPA stated that "the 1851
statute virtually eliminates any meaningful liability on the part of the
o\vner or operator and \vould unravel the balance of liability set forth
herein." 2r·9 Therefore, the OPA explicitly supersedes the LLA's liability
lhnits \vith respect to claims for cleanup costs and damages resulting
from a discharge of oil, and establishes its own schedule of liability limits
210
for damages resulting from the oil discharge. The OPA specifically
prohibits the use of the LLA by an OPA ''responsible party."211 Moreover,
the LLA \Vas superseded as to claims under state oil pollution statutes.212
One of the first cases to address the issue of whether the LLA still
213
The case
applies to claims relating to an oil spill was In re Spray.
began when, on July I, 1995, the MN JAHRE SPRAY, a self-propelled
tank vessel O\vned by a Norwegian company, loaded a full cargo of Rabi
light crude from West AJiica and headed for Coastal Eagle Point Oil
274
Company (Coastal) re!mery in Ne\v Jersey.
The JAHRE SPRAY
transferred the crude to the refinery from July 21 to the late afternoon of
July 22. 27s That afternoon, when the transfer was nearly complete,
personnel from the vessel observed an increase in \vind and ordered a
276
shut do\vn of the vessel's pumps.
Later, after the vessel was struck by sudden high winds and heavy
rain, it gradually moved offthe dock. 211 At that time, two cargo hoses and
20

266. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183, 186.
267. See Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 R2d 234, 239 (9th Cir. 1989).
268. See, e.g., In re Glacier Bay, 944 E2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissing complaint for
limitation or exoneration of liability pursuant to LLA because TAPAA implicitly repealed
application ofLLA in regard to transportation of trans-Alaskan oil).
269. S. REP. No. 101-94, at4 (1989),reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 736.
270. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994); see also Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 R3d
1344, 1347{1IthCir.1998).
271. 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
272. The OPA explicitly permits states to adopt la\vs imposing additional liability for oil
spills above the liability limits established by the OPA and the LLA. Id. § 2718(c)(l).
273. In re Spray, No. 95-3495, 1996 \VL45!315, at *I (D.N.J.Aug. 5, 1996).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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213

one bunker hose were connected to the shore rnanifold. As the vessel
was blown off berth, the three hoses parted and approximately I 000
barrels of oil flo\ved into the Dela\vare River from the Coastal facility
onshore. ~ A small amount of oil also flowed from the vessel into the
21

river.

230

On July 26, 1995, Coastal filed a complaint seeking exoneration
from, or limitation of, liability pursuant to the LLA. 231 The plaintiffs
conceded that those who fall within the category of "responsible parties"
or "sole cause third parties" under the OPA are not entitled to limit their

liability under LLA for claims raised under OPA, but contended that they
were neither the discharger, nor a sole cause third party, as defined by the
OPA. 2&• The court determined that the plaintiffs' classification \vas
233
irrelevant. It held that, in light of the plain meaning of the OPA and its
legislative history, the LLA does not apply to claims relating to an oil
spill.284
In a more recent case, the court examined the interaction bet\veen
the OPA and the LLA."' In determining that the OPA explicitly
superseded the LLA, the court stated that "a plain reading of [the OPA]
suggesta that the OPA repealed the [LLA] with respect to removal cost
and damages claims against responsible parties."2% In supporting its
decision, the court concluded that at least four provisions of the OPA
unequivocally revoked the LLA with respect to certain types of claims.2"1
One provision of the OPA repealed the LLA "as to third parties solely
responsible for an [oil] spill."23s A second provision of the Act repealed
the LLA "as to state and local statutory rernedies." s~ Another OPA
provision repealed the LLA "as to additional liability imposed by the
United States, any state, or political subdivision."290 The OPA also
repealed the LLA "as to fines and penalties."291
2

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at*3-*5.
See In re Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818 (I st Cir. 1997).
See id. at 821.
Id.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(d)(l)(A) (1994)).
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)).
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c)(l )).
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c)(2)).
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The court also decided that the LLA had been repealed by
implication. 2''1 The court reasoned that, since key provisions of the LLA
and the OPA are inconsistent, the OPA, the later statute, should control!93
For example, the first inconsistency noted by the court \Vas that "the LLA
limits the shipo\vner's liability to the post-accident value of the vessel
plus pending freight, 294 \vhile the OPA contemplates a strict liability
regime \vith statutory limits of at least $2 million for tank vessels and $5
million for all other ''essels."2Js The Court also pointed out that the
290

pro\'isions on jurisdiction in the t\vo Acts conflict. Proceedings under
297
the LLA can only be held in federal court, \Vhereas, OPA claims can be
litigated in federal or state court.293

IV. THE OPA: ARE CHANGES NEEDED?
\Vhen Congress passed the OPA, one of its principle goals \Vas to
create a comprehensive oil pollution liability scheme. ~' Congress
achieved that goal by consolidating several disparate federal oil spill
liability st.atutes into one comprehensive statute that sets out the liability
for oil spills. Joi The end result \Vas a legal regime that promotes
efficiency and judicial economy. For example, the parties involved in an
oil spill have to consult only one authority to determine their rights and
responsibilities. Nonetheless, after more than 4380 days, the st.atute
needs to be checked to see if changes are necessary. The st.atute \Vas
passed in response to the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill.301 Thus, the
benchmark for evaluating its effectiveness is if it contains the liability
provisions necessary to deal with a similar type of incident.
The OPA pro\rides the government access to a permanent domestic
fund for remo,ral operations.' 0i The fund allows the government to
undertake remo\'al operations in emergency situations or \Vhen the
responsible party fails to clean up the spill.303 Congress est.ablished the
OPA fund because the funds available under pre-OPA st.atutes cont.ained
2

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.; sce46 U.S.C. app. § 1S3(a) (1994).
295. In re AJetlife, 132 F.3d at S22; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2704.
296. See In re Afetlife, 132 F.3d at 822.
297. See id. (citing In re Dammers & \.'anderheide & Schc"'Pvaart r.1aats Christina B.V.,
836 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1988)).
298. In rcA!ctlifc, 132 F.3d at 822; scc33 U.S.C. § 2717(b)-(c).
299. Jones, supra note 99, at 10,334.
300. Id. at 10,337.
301. See S\Va!ISon, supra note 32, at 142.
§ 1321(5).
302. 33
303. Id.§ 132J(c).

u.s.c.
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inadequate resources to fund the cleanup of a major oil spill.'!}: It is
important that the fund contain enough financial resources because there
probably \Vill be major oil spills in the future and there are fe\v, if any,

responsible parties \vho can afford to spend the amount of money that
Exxon did. 305 Consequently, the government \Vill be forced to contribute
to the removal operations.

The current financial resources available under the OPA are not
sufficient to clean up an oil spill the size of the EXXON VALDEZ oil

spill. The magnitude of efforts of state and federal governments, the
public, and Exxon to contain and clean up the spill, rescue \vildlife, and

study the effects of the spill was unprecedented. 1c6 The cleanup effort
101

cost Exxon more than $2 billion over four years.
In September of
1991, Ex.-xon entered into a consent decree \vith the governments of the
United States and Alaska to settle all pending civil and criminal matters
103
arising out ofthe oil spill.
Over ten years after the oil spill, the environment in Bligh Reef still
bears the scars. In its February 1999 status report, the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill Trustee Council reported that of hventy-three species of living
things adversely ·affected by the disaster only two-the bald eagle and the
ri\'er otter-are fully recovered. 309 The fish that provided the livelihood
for the sound are still recovering. Thus, limited commercial fishing has
been allowed to resume after several years of closure. I-Io\vever, the
fishing income has been cut in half, from an annual high of $80 million
the year before the spill to less than $40 million in 2000. 310 Thus, before
Congress agrees to allo\V drilling in Alaska, it needs to implement
systems to increase the amount of money available in the fund.

The OPA attempts to fairly distribute liability.

By making the

amount of liability dependent upon the size of the vessel, the OPA tries to
ensure that parties gaining the most benefit from oil transportation have

304. See Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1989).
305. See infra text accompanying note 307.
306. Sec l·lodgson, supra note 109, at 4.
307. Id. 11! 4. Tiie fishing communities near the spill area sued Exxon and, on September
16, 1994, the jury a\vardcd them $5 billion in punitive damages. Sec Inn: El';.;:On \'aldcz, 229
F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir. 2000). Exxon's motion to set aside the judgment \vas denied. In re Ex.'i:on
Valdez,A89-0095-C\; 1995 WL 527989, at *5 (D.AlaskaJan. 27, 1995).
308. See Eyak Native Vill. v. E;.;xon Corp., 25 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S.1102(1994).
309. See Mc}"'adden, supra. note 9, at h!tp://,V\V\V.mmbc.comlne\vs/252314.asp.
310. George Le\vis, Alaska Lives With an Unwanted Legacy, MSNBC, at http:/l\V\V\V.
m~nbc.comlnl.'\Vs/252495.asp (Mar. 24, 2001 ).
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the most responsibility for keeping the navigable waters clean.311 Further,
the fact that the OPA repealed the LLA, with regard to oil spills, shows
that Congress was serious about making parties who pollute pay for the
damage they cause to the environment.;12 Ho\vever, the current liability
caps under the OPA are too low. Thus, if another EXXON VALDEZ-size

oil spill occurs, the federal government will be forced to cover the cost of
cleaning up the damage. For instance, had Ex.xon been allowed to limit
its liability, Prince William Sound \vould be in worse environmental
shape than it is no\v. Therefore, Congress should consider removing or

increasing the liability allo\vance under the OPA.
The OPA does not preempt state oil pollution laws or specify a
313

single forum for the adjudication of claims.
Because different state
statutes have different liability standards from each other, and, in some
cases, from the federal statutes, the responsible party will be unable to
predict the possible outcome of its case. )14 As a result, Congress has
failed to achieve its goal of creating a more comprehensive and
predictable liability regime. Because states can institute liability
standards that go beyond what is mandated by the OPA, the current
liability regime is not much different from the one that existed prior to
the passage of the OPA. In order to establish uniformity, Congress
should change the OPA so that it preempts state oil pollution laws. The
lack of a designated forum may lead to forum shopping. It could also
lead to a lack ofjudicial economy because judges \Vill not be able to gain
expertise in dealing \vith the OPA. Hence, Congress should change the
OPA to indicate that all claims under the Act must be filed in federal
court since the liability regime is created by a federal statute.
The impact of the OPA is \veakened by the Act's exclusion of
discharges of oil from public vessels. Under the OPA, the definition of
"public vessel" is extremely broad. It includes vessels the government
1
o\vns and those the government charters. ' " This expansive definition
could allo\v numerous vessels to escape liability for damage caused by
oil spills. If oil drilling is allowed in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
the OPA may have to be amended to place some liability on public
\'essels in order to encourage the government to take extra care in the
area. In the alternative, Congress should limit the definition of public
311. Nat'! Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran:Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 E Supp. 1436, 1447

n.6 (E.D. Va. 1996).
312.
313.
314.
315.

See33U.S.C.§2718(1994).
See Vickers, supra note 71, at 410-11.
Seeid.
33 U.S.C. § 2701(29).
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vessel, under the OPA, to only those vessels that are solely owned by the
government.
Exxon has already spent more than $2 billion dollars, an amount
that exceeds the liability limits established by the OPA, to clean up Prince
William Sound and the area still has not recovered from the oil spill.~
Consequently, it is doubtful that the current liability scheme created by
the OPA will have much of an impact on an oil spill of that magnitude.
Thus, more than 4380 days after EXXON VALDEZ, it is time for
Congress to make some changes to the OPA.
10

316. See Theodore Roosevelt rv, An Erological Betrayal, BOSTON GLOBE, SepL 4, 2001, at

Al5.
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